Abstract-One of the major challenges in ad hoc networks is to ensure nodal collaboration. Nevertheless, collaboration may lead to undesired results when nodes can exploit their siblings for their own benefits. Until recently, the research community focused on ensuring nodal cooperation at the network layer. In this work we focus on node behavior at the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. More specifically, this work focus on mechanisms to evaluate nodal activity and verify whether a node is adhering to the protocol rules or not. We show that misconduct at the MAC layer can have serious implications in terms of throughput. Our main contribution is a mechanism that enables nodes to monitor neighboring activity and assess their conduct based on the observed information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have grown and developed in the last decades. They can now be found in offices, hospitals, and in the houses of millions of people. Although they are present in our daily life, most of them are dependent of a centralized infrastructure. Ad hoc networks are formed by mobile autonomous devices that are capable of configuring among themselves to form a network without the help of a fixed infrastructure. The creation of a network became easy and has a low cost. Ad hoc networks also demand for more specialized routing algorithms and efficient means to deal with medium access, which demands for more elaborated solutions.
Ad hoc networks inherits most of the traditional wireless networks problems, such as interference, low reliability, low bandwidth, high influence of the environment for the correct functionality of the network, limited resources in terms of battery and processor power, and low service coverage [3] . Since the transmission distance of the nodes is limited, communication among nodes which are outside the radio range of each other is possible only if there is cooperation. In such context, cooperation means that each node must relay data to other nodes, which implies in more battery and processor power usage. As the resources are limited, cooperation can be expensive, and this can cause some nodes to have a selfish behavior. Such nodes are termed as misbehaving nodes. A misbehaving node uses the knowledge of the underline protocols for their own benefits. In a cooperative environment, such behavior can have serious impacts on the entire network [11] .
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Thus, it is important to identify misbehaving nodes and define mechanisms to prevent and deal with them.
The network dynamics and the lack of infrastructure discards the use of centralized mechanisms for control access, authentication, or even traffic control. Such schemes, must therefore, be implemented in a distributed way. There are many proposals that use cryptography for safe routing. However these proposals are limited and do not consider the lack of infrastructure and resources [10] . Another option is the use of reputation and trust systems, similar to Ebay [9] . These schemes can be applied to ad hoc networks to prevent misbehavior and stimulate node cooperation [4] , [8] , [13] , [2] . Reputation systems need to be robust to identify and prevent that misbehavior nodes participate and degrade the network performance.
Until recently, the research community was concerned in observing nodal behavior at the network layer. This was achieved by checking whether or not a node was correctly forwarding packets [6] . However, a misbehaved node can act not only in the network layer but also in other layers. For example, in the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, nodes must wait a random time before transmitting, known as backoff. This period is generated randomly and independently for each node with the aim to prevent collisions. It is possible that a misbehaving node does not respect the minimum Contention Window -(CW ) and, as a result, transmits more than the expected. This paper is focused on studying this problem. Although there are other works in this direction, as discussed in Section II, none of them deal with the amount of information a node has to gather in order to have higher confidence in determining the misbehavior level. In other words, this work attempts to estimate the amount of data one has to collect in order to better judge its neighbors' conduct. Obviously, the more data one collects the better the accuracy will be. But what is the minimum amount of information one should gather before an action is taken? Our results give insights in this direction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to address this problem.
II. RELATED WORK
The task of relaying a message in an ad hoc network has a high cost, both in terms of battery and processing power [6] . As such resources are limited, a node cooperates with other nodes presuming that it will receive the same treatment when necessary. This assumption is valid in a collaborative environment and serve as motivation for a node to forward other node's packets. However, other mechanisms could also be used to ensure cooperation. Proposals based on credits, such as those in [5] and [15] , try to incentive nodal cooperation. The idea is to use a type of credit, or virtual payment, to reward a node for its service, that is, a node receives a virtual payment to forward other nodes' packets.
Another way of ensuring nodal cooperation is to select nodes which are prone to collaborate. However, for this idea to work, one has to know whether or not a node is keen to collaborate. This can be achieved via a reputation system, which works by monitoring neighboring activities and classifying them as cooperative or not. Cooperative nodes are them selected to perform tasks, such as routing. The works in [13] , [8] and [4] are example of reputation systems. The scheme proposed in [13] , enforces cooperation by restricting selfish nodes to obtain certain resource. The protocol is based in a monitoring mechanism combined with a reputation table present in each node. The scheme in [8] , tries to establish trust among devices which are willing to cooperation. Here, the reputation of a node is evaluated based on its behavior when forwarding packets. In [4] , each node is composed of four components: monitor, trust manager, reputation manager, and routes manager. The monitor observes the transmission channel and identifies packets detour. When this happens the reputation manager is called. The trust manager sends an alert message to warn the existence of a malicious node. Each alert received is filtered to verify the trust level of the alert message.
The above works attempt to evaluate the reputation on a given node based on its behavior. However, these works are focused on events generated at the network layer. The work prosed in [12] , termed DOMINO, is a misbehavior detection system centered at the MAC layer events. Basically, its main goal is to detect and identify stations that increase their bandwidth by changing some protocol properties. DOMINO considers the existence of an access point where the detection system is present, that is, domino is tailored for infrastructured mode. The system has two stages: data collection and malicious nodes identification. The first stage is done in regular time periods where traffic from the stations are collected. Based on the collected information, the second stage verifies whether a node is misbehaving or not. A number of tests are used to evaluate behavior of a node, such as: 1) Number of successful transmissions and overall number of collisions; 2) Average backoff time observed for each neighboring node; 3) Respect to frame space intervals (such as DIFS, DCF Inter Frame space); 4) Bogus information on RTS/CTS frames to set the Network Allocation Vector -NAV longer than necessary.
The authors have shown that DOMINO can effectively identify misbehaving nodes. Despite its advantages, DOMINO has its drawbacks as well. In the first test, listed above, a node can be misclassified when there is a fierce competition to the channel. To see this, consider the case in which two nodes, say N a and N b are neighbors. Also, suppose that N a has several neighbors, including N b . Note that neighbors of N a are not necessarily neighbors of N b . In this scenario, N a packets have a higher change to collide than N b packets. In this case, N b may have higher throughput and as a consequence can be classified as a misbehaving node. The averaged backoff test consists in estimating the value of a station backoff and verify if the mean value is lower than a normal backoff value. In the presence of interference, such estimation may lead to wrong results. The third test is quite easy to verify that, as all the nodes have to obey inter-frames spaces as defined in the IEEE802.11 [7] . It is arguable that only a naive node would use such approach as it would be easily detected. Assuming that the purpose of misbehaving node is to take advantage over other nodes to increase its throughput, as it is assumed in DOMINO, a node would gain nothing by reserving more time than necessary for its transmission, that is, increasing the NAV (Network Allocation Vector) would just make other stations silent. Again, this can be easily verified by neighboring nodes.
As mentioned before, in this work we are interested in finding evidence that characterizes misconduct. For that, a certain amount of information must be collected. Here, we are interested in establishing a direct link between the collected data and the misconduct level. As mentioned before, this work attempts to estimate the amount of data one has to collect in order to better judge its neighbors' conduct. The next section details how this can be achieved.
III. MISCONDUCT IDENTIFICATION
Our work focuses in trying to identify selfish nodes at the MAC layer. More precisely, our work focuses on identifying misconduct when a node modifies its CW to improve its chance to gain channel access. After a successful transmission, according to the IEEE802.11 [1], a node would select a backoff value randomly from zero up to CW − 1. Thus, by selecting a lower value, a node is likely to wait a shorter period of time to attempt to gain channel access. However, due to the characteristics of the CSMA/CA [1], a node may obtain channel access consecutive times, which does not characterizes misconduct. In other words, even a node that adhere to the protocol rules, over a certain period of time, may gain channel access more than others. Hence, we are interested in knowing the limit at which a node's conduct is within the protocol parameters and when its above. Here we focus on ad hoc networks and our scheme attempts to preserve, as much as possible, the node's resources such as battery and processing power.
Instead of trying to estimate a station backoff directly, we observe its throughput, and from that, we can estimate its backoff. In an ad hoc environment, trying to estimate a station's backoff directly can have high price. Also, a malicious node may intentionally disrupt control or data packets, forcing its neighboring nodes to increase their contention windows due to collisions. In such case, the backoff used by the malicious node may even adhere to the protocol. Nevertheless, the throughput of the malicious node will be higher.
One may argue that different applications demand for different transmission rates. Although this is true, there are several schemes in which one can obtain information from the upper layers and determine which class of traffic, being it voice, video or others, a node is using. Indeed, the IEEE802.11e [14] has such differentiation and could be used by our scheme. The IEEE802.11e standard defines four types of traffic priorities, which are background, best effort, video and voice. The former type of traffic has the lowest priority and the last on the highest. The standard is still new but its use is likely to spread soon. Of course, a node could eventually change the priority of its traffic, however, as the packets are send over a shared medium, neighboring nodes would be able to gather data and verify whether the information is correct or not. Also, the destination node could provide insights about the behavior of the sender node.
The goal here is to characterize a malicious node. For that purpose, each node observes the the activity of its neighbors. In special, it records the successful transmissions over a period of time. Note that, in order to save battery power, a node may monitor the RTS (or CTS) and the corresponding ACK packets. Based on the collected information, the observing node would compare its own number of transmissions with the neighboring nodes number of transmissions in the observed period using the following equation:
where t is the current time, T m (t), is the number of transmissions of the observed node m, T n (t) is the number of transmission of the observer n. S n (t) × δ is considered a threshold, where, S n (t) is the observer standard deviation and δ is defined as tolerance, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The tolerance can be viewed as a way to calibrate the threshold, the smaller the tolerance is, more strict the scheme will be. The tolerance calibration is important since a low tolerance value can be enough for a given setting but the same value can leave a malicious node undetected in another. Conversely, a high tolerance value can be necessary when its difficult to detect misbehaving nodes, but this may take longer to detect malicious activity. We define a malicious score, M s n , where 0 ≤ M s n ≤ 1 and m is the observed node. If the inequality 1 holds, then we set M s n (t) = 1, else M s n (t) = 0. We also define an aging mechanism by using a weighted mean of the malicious score, which we called malicious level, computed as shown below:
The use of an aging is important as it can provide redemption to nodes that misconduct in the past but are now well behaved. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the CSMA/CA may cause nodes to have transmissions busts, which may classify them as misbehaved nodes. Thus, with an aging mechanism, such problems are diminished.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to show the performance of our scheme, in this section we evaluate it in a number of settings. For each simulation we have scenarios composed of two, four, eight, sixteen, and thirty two nodes. The results are drawn from an average of a hundred tests, which we call as a simulation run. We fixed the amount of time for each test as a function on the number of nodes participating in the simulations. Here, a test with four nodes takes twice as much time as the test for two nodes. This work considers ad hoc networks in with the following characteristics:
• The nodes are static;
• Nodes communicate in single-hop;
• The tests include a single malicious node;
• All nodes are continuously trying to transmit. Prior to the data transmission, that is, when the node gain channel access, each transmitting node obeys the 4-way handshake with RTS/CTS followed by Data and ACK.
A. Successful Transmissions
To evaluate the number of successful transmissions, we try to estimate the CW values a selfish node would use to pass undetected and when it would be easily spotted. One important question to answer is how much a misbehaved node could transmit more than a normal node without being considered malicious. For this threshold we use the standard deviation. However in some cases this threshold could be too large or too small. Thus, our goal is to observe the percentage of successful transmissions by the malicious node as well as by the well behaved ones. Figure 1 shows the simulation results for two, eight and thirty two nodes in the presence of a single malicious node. The x − axis shows the maximum CW value selected by the malicious node and the y−axis shows the averaged number of transmissions for misbehaved node and well behaved nodes. The figure shows the standard deviation for each point. As can be observed in the figure, when a malicious node lowers its contention window slightly it can pass undetected as the number of successful transmissions is very close to the well behaved nodes. With an increase on the number of nodes, the standard deviation increases as well, which makes it harder to identify malicious activity when the contention window is within bounds of the well behaved nodes. The values at which the malicious node activity becomes evident are shown with a vertical mark on the figure. As can be observed, with thirty two nodes, the malicious node would only be detected if its CW was set to be less than 12, up to this value, there could misclassification.
In order to better understand the channel usage we have analyzed the number of possible successful transmissions using the binomial distribution. The results are shown in Figure 2 . For each point we consider the standard deviation and we use the binomial distribution to calculate what is the Normal Node in two nodes simulation Malicious Node in two nodes simulation Normal Node in eight nodes simulation8 Malicious Node in eight nodes simulation Normal Node in thirty two nodes simulation Malicious Node in thirty two nodes simulation Fig. 2 . Binomial Distribution probability for this event to occur in a normal case. If the probability is too low, it means that the node is misbehaving. It is important to note that with the binomial distribution, misbehavior mean not only that the node is transmitting more than normal but it can also mean that it is transmitting less than expected. For instance, with thirty two nodes, as shown in the figure, the binomial distribution finds that the averaged number of transmissions of the well behaved nodes is within bounds until the malicious node selects a CW below 6. With eight nodes, the malicious node can be detected, with a probability of less than 15%, if it choses a CW of 13. This means that if a malicious node is not too greedy, it can pass undetected with high probability. Also, the more nodes is in the vicinity, the more aggressive the malicious node can be without being spotted.
Observing Figure 2 , and comparing it with the values obtained in Figure 1 , one can see that the malicious node curve, in the binomial distribution, reaches a very low value near the point at which the normal nodes and selfish nodes curve start to deviate. By observing these results we can see that the well behaved nodes can only detect that there is something wrong when the misbehaving node is cheating with a much lower CW then that used by the other nodes. The identification of misbehavior gets harder with the increase of nodes. In other words, when the behavior of a malicious node deviates slightly, it can take long time to identify it, and the larger the number nodes, the harder it becomes.
B. Misconduct Grading
The goal of this section attempts to verify if Equation 2 correctly grades a node based on its backoff window. However, when a node starts collecting data, it has little information about its neighbors. Thus, to start, the observer may classify its neighbors as well behaved at the beginning. Here, we have fixed the tolerance (δ) using values ranging from zero (0) up to 0.9. The results are shown for CW values of 15,14, and 13. We are not presenting the results for all possible CW values of the observed node as a lower CW value will only make the curve to converge faster. Figures 3, 4 and ,5, shows the misconduct level for four, eight and thirty two nodes. The x − axis shows the simulation time (in seconds) and the y − axis shows the malicious level of the observed node.
We consider a CW value of 15 as being a correct backoff value. As can be observed in Figure 3 , with tolerance δ = 0.8, and CW = 14 the curves will converge to zero, showing that the node is well behaved. The time to converge to zero can be lowered by decreasing the δ. As discussed before, the more a node learns about its environment, the better its classification will be. Thus, as the time goes by and the observer gathers information about its neighboring activity, the malicious level for well behaved nodes will tend to zero while the curve for a malicious nodes will tend to one. Based on the results and experiments we have conduced, we found that an appropriate value for the tolerance would be as follows:
where n is the number of nodes and C is a constant. The constant value will depend on the network parameters, such as number of transmissions the the amount of collected data.
We can see in the Figures that an appropriate tolerance for two nodes is near 0.8. So for n = 2 we can use δ(2) = 0.8, that will give us that C = 0.8. Using C = 0.8 for the other scenarios with normal communications, would give us the following tolerances: δ(2) = 0.8, δ(4) = 0.4, δ(8) = 0.2, δ(16) = 0.1, δ(32) = 0.05. If we observe the graphs we can see that this tolerance values guarantees that normal behavior curves decreases and malicious behavior curves increases as time goes by. Hence, Equation 2 seems appropriate to grade the misbehavior level of a node. Furthermore, by adjusting the appropriate parameters, one can tune the system as desired.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
An ideal reputation system for ad hoc networks should be worried in verifying nodal activity in all layers. Nevertheless, up to now most of the reputation systems proposed in the literature focus on a given layer, usually the network layer. As we have shown, a malicious node could easily act in another layer without being detected. Indeed, the MAC layer can be quite easy to trick and would provide the cheater with much higher throughput, as we have shown.
Although in this work we have shown that a lower contention window provides advantages for a misbehaved node, it would be clear that even when a node adhere to the protocol rules, in terms of backoff, a node may resort to other mechanisms to obligate neighbors to increase their contention window values. Although our results shows that the higher the number of nodes, the greediness of the malicious node may leave the cheater undetected for a good deal of time, and, in certain cases, such identification may not be possible without increasing the chance of misclassify a well behaved node. So, one need to careful and avoid taking premature decision as the change of misclassification can be high at certain levels.
